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Abstract
Background: Impulsivity is defined as intolerance/aversion to waiting for reward. In intolerance-
to-delay (ID) protocols, animals must choose between small/soon (SS) versus large/late (LL)
rewards. In the probabilistic discount (PD) protocols, animals are faced with choice between small/
sure (SS) versus large/luck-linked (LLL) rewards. It has been suggested that PD protocols also
measure impulsivity, however, a clear dissociation has been reported between delay and probability
discounting.
Results: Wistar adolescent rats (30- to 46-day-old) were tested using either protocol in drug-free
state. In the ID protocol, animals showed a marked shift from LL to SS reward when delay
increased, and this despite adverse consequences on the total amount of food obtained. In the PD
protocol, animals developed a stable preference for LLL reward, and maintained it even when SS
and LLL options were predicted and demonstrated to become indifferent. We demonstrate a clear
dissociation between these two protocols. In the ID task, the aversion to delay was anti-economical
and reflected impulsivity. In the PD task, preference for large reward was maintained despite its
uncertain delivery, suggesting a strong attraction for unitary rewards of great magnitude.
Conclusion: Uncertain delivery generated no aversion, when compared to delays producing an
equivalent level of large-reward rarefaction. The PD task is suggested not to reflect impulsive
behavior, and to generate patterns of choice that rather resemble the features of gambling. In
summary, present data do indicate the need to interpret choice behavior in ID and PD protocols
differently.
Background
Lack of self-control abilities is an important symptom of
many psychiatric disorders, notably in the attention defi-
cit/hyperactivity disorder (Sagvolden and Sergeant, 1998;
Swanson et al., 1998; Sonuga-Barke, 2003). There is
indeed a growing interest in the study of impulsive deci-
sion in humans (Krawczyk, 2002; Bechara, 2004). As for
animal models, many different aspects of impulsivity
have been studied with operant-behavior paradigms. In
laboratory settings, impulsive behavior can be defined in
terms of "poor" decision making, based on anomalous
processing of actual incentive values of the two alterna-
tives (Evenden, 1999; Ho et al., 1999; Monterosso and
Ainslie, 1999). In one of the most widely adopted para-
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digms, the intolerance-to-delay (ID) protocol, slightly
food-restricted animals are tested in operant-behavior
cages, where they are provided with choice between either
one immediate pellet of food (small-and-soon, SS) or five
pellets of food after a delay (large-but-late, LL). Animals
classically shift their preference from the LL to the SS
reward as delay increases. Since impulsive subjects are
intolerant to the forced waiting for a delayed reward, a
flatter or a steeper shift towards SS choice are a classical
index of reduced or increased impulsivity, respectively
(Evenden and Ryan, 1996, 1999).
It has been suggested that impulsive subjects may also
avoid conditions where the reward income is made uncer-
tain. Such suggestion implies that both "uncertainty" and
delay of reward will elicit the same underlying form of
intolerance (Mazur 1995; Rachlin et al. 1991). This is
based on the assumption that any randomly omitted
reward will force animals to wait for one of the next trials
(the "lucky" one) to get actual reinforcement, and that
they need to cope with this unpleasant but forced procras-
tination. It has been demonstrated that the perceived
value of a given reinforcer is discounted similarly follow-
ing both "delay" and "probabilistic gaps" in the delivery
of rewards (Richards et al., 1999; Ho et al., 1999). Moreo-
ver, the detection of reward value across its delayed or
uncertain delivery has been suggested to require a com-
mon neural substrate, namely an intact nucleus
accumbens (Cardinal and Cheung 2005; Cardinal and
Howes 2005). However, there is evidence that time- and
probability-induced discounting are different and dissoci-
able processes (Green et al. 1999; Green and Myerson
2004). This notion should be kept in mind, since a shift
from a small-and-sure (SS) towards a probabilistic (large-
but-luck-linked, LLL) reward is often discussed in terms of
impulsivity-driven aversion for uncertainty in classical lit-
erature studies that used probabilistic-discount (PD) pro-
tocols (Mobini et al., 2000, 2002).
A crucial point in intolerance-based tasks is to consider
whether the actual parameters make the shift in prefer-
ence (from large reward in either protocol, termed LL/L, to
SS) economically convenient or not. In the ID task, delay
duration is always imposed in a range of values which
render any SS shift overtly sub-optimal, and this assump-
tion is actually confirmed by present data. Conversely,
within uncertainty-based tasks, probability ("p") values to
be imposed can be divided into two distinct fields, sepa-
rated by the indifference-point "p" value (calculated as
"small reward size"/"large reward size", e.g. 20% in our
present work, where SS was 1 and LL/L was 5). In the
range of "p" values before the mathematical indifference
point (100% > p > 20%), the risk of large reinforcement
loss is mild relative to its size. Under these conditions, it
is still "economically" convenient for rats to choose the
LLL (average outcome being still more than one pellet per
nose-poking) over SS reward (only one pellet per nose-
poking). Hence, if animals display a shift towards SS, this
would be interpreted as an intolerance reaction against
uncertainty. In the range of "p" values beyond the mathe-
matical indifference point (20% > p > 0%), it becomes
"economically" convenient for rats to choose SS (one cer-
tain pellet per nose-poking) over LLL reward (the average
outcome being less than one pellet per nose-poking). In
classical literature studies (Mobini et al., 2000, 2002),
untreated control animals showed a shift from the proba-
bilistic towards the certain reward, but this happened
under conditions that rendered such a shifting actually
optimal in terms of food gain. This consideration raises
the possibility that the observed shift rather represented
the obvious consequence of the natural drive towards
food maximization. By definition, impulsive decisions are
taken "without consideration of (negative) conse-
quences". Hence, only those behavioral responses, which
can be demonstrated to be still adopted despite adverse
consequences on total foraging, can be defined as truly
impulsive.
In the present experiment, we wished to directly compare
the ID and PD protocols, to evaluate whether or not ado-
lescent rats would display an equivalent intolerance
towards delay vs uncertainty of reward delivery. The spe-
cific age-period for testing was chosen mainly because the
peculiar behavioral instability, which is typical of adoles-
cence as demonstrated by previous work (Laviola et al.,
1999, 2003; Spear, 2000), might be pushing animals
towards extreme drives at this age, such as novelty- and
risk-oriented behavior. We employed a range of delay/
probability values under which the "optimal" choice
would always be the large reward. In this way, any shift
towards the SS reward would be a "true" index of impul-
sivity-driven intolerance, since it would be anti-economi-
cal from the point of view of foraging optimization. As
expected, in the ID protocol, animals shifted towards the
SS reward, a classical index of impulsive choice. Con-
versely, in the PD protocol, animals did not shift against
economical convenience. Rather, their preference for the
LLL reward was very stable, being maintained even when
its delivery was made very infrequent, so that it would be
economically convenient to shift to the SS one, at least in
theory.
As a final remark, we wish to underline that the indiffer-
ence point is separating, in both protocols, the field where
LL/L choice is always optimal from the field where the SS
choice would be optimal. Such turning point (i.e. odds
against obtaining the large reinforcer being 4 in our exper-
iment) is mainly based on abstract mathematical calcula-
tion and comparison of the final payoff obtained with a
clear-cut (i.e. 100%) SS vs LL/L choice. However, theBMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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behavioral strategy adopted by rats is rather complex, con-
sisting of preferential choice at a given hole plus a lower
but constant patrolling at the other hole. Under these con-
ditions, rats are unlikely to detect very slight differences
between the two alternative outcomes, and may hence be
under quasi-indifference conditions. Thus, rather than
being pushed by overt economical convenience, animals
might express their hole-preference based on the emo-
tional evaluation of rewarding features issuing from either
alternative option. A further aim of the present work was
to compare the economical contingencies of the two pro-
cedures around the indifference point. Specifically, we
compared actual foraging with theoretical food gain, ide-
ally obtained by maintenance of LL choice in ID task and
by a shift to SS reward in PD task. Specifically, we calcu-
lated what amount of food rats could have eaten if they
behaved just as their siblings in the other protocol did.
Such a calculation allowed to assess what economical
conditions rats were actually facing. Such analysis was
focused on the specific window around the mathematical
indifference point, which represents a sort of upper limit
in intolerance-based tasks. Indeed, to avoid the bias of an
economically-driven preference shift as outlined above,
task contingencies shall be able to generate phenomena of
behavioral intolerance by this point.
Results
Choice behavior in either protocol
Following one week of training, all rats exhibited as
expected a significant preference for the large over the
small reward. However, a certain "baseline" level of nose-
poking for small reward (average choice: 30.5 ± 4.4% for
the small and 69.5 ± 4.4% for the large reward) was
always present. This finding replicated previous experi-
ments in our lab (Adriani et al., 2004), indicating that ani-
mals were never completely attracted by the larger reward,
but constantly probed the outcome of nose-poking at the
other hole.
When the delay or the probabilistic challenge were gradu-
ally increased over days (see Table 1), interestingly the
profile differed as a function of the task, protocol × ses-
sion, F(10,70) = 8.96, p < .001 (see Figures 2 and 3).
Namely, in the ID protocol, rats showed a dramatic shift
towards SS choice at the highest delays. This profile is clas-
sically described as a manifestation of intolerance, gener-
ated by the delay. Indeed, by definition, the optimal
choice would be to maintain nose-poking for large
reward, at least until a delay of 100 s, which would be sub-
stantially equivalent to odds = 4 (the mathematical indif-
ference point, see Table 1). The shift towards SS reward
seems a nice form of impulsive decision making, with
adverse consequences on total foraging. Conversely, in
the PD protocol, rats showed quite the opposite profile.
Namely, a robust trend was shown towards enhanced
preference for the LLL choice, which attained a maximal
level of 87.5 ± 5.1%. With the PD protocol, we never
observed a shift towards SS choice. Data indicate no such
a reaction, even in spite of a high degree of probabilistic
rarefaction (odds 5 and 6).
This profile may appear somewhat "surprising", based on
the classical prediction of uncertainty-induced reward dis-
counting. However, present data are a clear-cut replication
of those recently obtained by our group, showing the
development of LLL preference in control adolescent rats
(Adriani et al., 2005). To explain why discounting of the
uncertain reward does not occur, we suggest a possibe role
for two key parameters adopted in these two works: 1) a
fivefold magnitude of the large versus the small reinforcer,
rendering the former highly attractive, and 2) the adop-
tion of a gradual day-by-day increase of uncertainty levels,
which possibly allowed rats to adapt progressively to such
a challenge. In these conditions, animals preferred to wait
for an "extremely lucky" event, being perhaps attracted by
"binge" reinforcement, without showing any intolerance
to its progressive rarefaction, possibly because the rise of
uncertainty was gradual.
Economic features of the two protocols
At the indifference point, an approximated and simplified
calculation about the maximal number of trials, available
in the time-limited session, shows that 1500 s (25 min)
can leave room to 75 trials × 20 s (1 s + 15 s timeout + 4 s
spontaneous waiting) in the PD task (and also in the ID
task with 100% SS selection), or to 18/19 trials × 80 s (1 s
+ 60 s delay + 15 s timeout + 4 s spontaneous waiting) in
the ID task with 100% LL selection. These two approxi-
mated values represent the two extremes of a range where
actual figures can lay. The average number of trials (LL/
L+SS) actually completed by rats was 59.0 ± 2.2 in the PD
task, and 22.6 ± 1.4 in the ID task. The mean inter-trial
interval actually shown by rats, namely the spontaneous
waiting between the end of a timeout interval and the next
nose-poking choice, was 9.9 ± 1.3 s in the PD task and
22.6 ± 3.3 s in the ID task, as calculated from raw data gen-
erated by animals. These results suggest that ID rats were
somewhat slower in completing a novel trial than their
PD siblings.
In the PD task, where no delay was present, the only time-
constraint was represented by the 1 s-interval between
nose-poking and food delivery plus the 15 s-timeout. Ani-
mals were thus free to express under availability of a max-
imal number of trials. For the ID task, each LL choice
triggered a very long delay, which represented an inflexi-
ble obstacle against expression of further food-rewarded
nose-poking acts. Two hypotheses can be raised: first, the
delay constraint during the ID task might have increased
the waiting abilities, possibly reducing the willingness ofBMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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rats to express quick nose-poking. Second, the stochastic
reward omission might be acting as a stimulating factor
within the PD task, motivating animals to further nose-
poke soon after a timeout had elapsed.
The core assumption of ID testing is that a shift towards
SS is sub-optimal and should be avoided. This was con-
firmed by theoretical data, generated under the hypo-
thesis that rats in the ID task maintained a preference for
LL, like their PD siblings did (see Table 2). In this case, as
revealed by a highly significant main effect of payoff,
F(1,7) = 27.7, p < .001, a significant difference in total
food gain was evident between "actual" (shifting towards
SS) and "potential" (non-shifting, LL preferring) choice
behavior. Specifically, the LL option rendered signifi-
cantly more food than the SS one, clearly indicating that
actual testing conditions were well before the indifference
point. Despite a priori calculations, which set a delay = 60
s in correspondence to the indifference point, a posteriori
data on equivalence between odds/probability and delay
demonstrate that the actual indifference point was
expected around delay = 100 s (Table 1). Thus, in the ID
task, rats appear to be under conditions where economical
convenience loaded onto the LL option, yet a strong
delay-induced LL aversion was observed. Since the latter
was expressed despite wide anti-economical conse-
quences, we can conclude that it can reliably be used as a
valid index of impulsivity.
Another interesting set of figures is generated by assuming
that rats in the PD task showed a shift towards SS like that
shown by their ID siblings (see Table 2). In this case, as
revealed by the lack of significance for the payoff factor,
F(1,7) = 0.399, NS, no significant differences in total food
gain were evident between "actual" (non-shifting, LLL
preferring) and "potential" (shifting towards SS) choice
behavior. Hence, rats appear to be under conditions of
economical indifference, as it was expected at least for
odds = 4. As for odds of 3 and 5, the difference in food
gain between "actual" and "potential" behavior is slight
and non significant, so that rats appear to be under a con-
dition of substantial quasi-indifference. Interestingly, a
strong LLL preference is always expressed across all odds
values. These data suggest that uncertainty factors were
not strong enough to produce any consequences, despite
the definition of impulsivity would require uncertainty to
produce an anti-economical intolerance, as was the case
in the ID task. It is likely that further increase in odds
value would eventually generate a SS shift, but such a shift
would then be promoted also by economic convenience,
thus questioning the validity of this parameter as a meas-
ure for impulsivity.
Discussion
This study compared the behavioral reaction to rarefac-
tion of large reinforcement in a pair of similar two-choice
operant-behavior tasks, where preference for large or
small rewards is assessed in food-restricted rats. We wish
to underline that the present animals were trained to con-
sume their daily meal during the testing session and
shortly when placed back into the home cage. In this way,
they were facing a 23 h/day feeding absence, and were
hence motivated to work for food during operant testing.
While undergoing this procedure, which is largely
adopted in the literature, rats are not under starvation nor
malnutrition, since they fully express a normal behavioral
repertoire in the home cage, including a playful social
behavior. The attributes of food reward in either test share
some similarities and some key differences. Namely, the
small reward (SS) is always for sure and comes immedi-
ately, whereas the large reward delivery may be either
delayed (ID protocol) or uncertain (PD protocol). Specific
Table 1: Synoptic table of comparison among odds, "p", and delay values across ID and PD tasks.
Odds "p" (%) A priori Delay (s) A posteriori Delay (s)
01 0 0 00
1/10 90 1.50 2.50
1/4 80 3.75 6.25
1/3 75 5.00 8.33
1/2 66 7.50 12.50
15 0 1 5 2 5
23 3 3 0 5 0
32 5 4 5 7 5
4 20 60 100 Indifference Point, PD task
51 6 . 6 7 5 1 2 5
61 4 . 3 9 0 1 5 0
Delay duration corresponding to each odds level was calculated a priori in the ideal situation (no spontaneous waiting). Equivalence between odds/
probability and delay was then re-estimated a posteriori for a more realistic account (the mean inter-trial interval due to spontaneous waiting was 
around 10 s in the PD task).BMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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values, to be run for each daily session, were selected after
an a priori calculation of the correspondence between
delays and odds/probability, aimed to produce a similar
level of rarefaction for LL/L delivery in both protocols.
This was to be sure that the striking differences in behav-
ior, generated by the two protocols, could not be
explained by gross differences in the maximal frequency
of large rewards potentially obtained, and should be
ascribed to other intrinsic key features. An a posteriori re-
estimation of equivalence between odds/probability and
delays was conducted, which scaled the whole curve gen-
erated by the ID task towards the left. As a result, differ-
ences between choice profiles in the two tasks were even
strengthened. Indeed, testing of animals until a delay of
150 s within the ID task, which would be substantially
equivalent to odds = 6 reached in the PF task, likely would
produce a further enhancement of the dissociation
observed between the two profiles.
The experimental observations reported here demonstrate
that the profile shown in PD protocols may differ substan-
tially from classical intolerance/aversion observed in ID
protocols. As classically reported, animals in the ID proto-
col then developed a robust aversion for the longest
delays, and showed a marked shift from LL to SS choice.
At this point, animals are likely to have realized that there
is nothing to do to avoid the elapsing of delay intervals,
and are therefore likely to develop an anti-economical
intolerance (Evenden, 1999; Ho et al., 1999; Monterosso
and Ainslie, 1999). Conversely, animals tested in the PD
protocol did not show the same profile. As a reaction to
an increasing proportion of omitted reinforcement, ani-
mals developed and maintained a robust preference for
LLL reward. Such behavior may in part be explained by
the fact that chamber and magazine lights, required to sig-
nal starting and ending of the time-out period, were also
turned on when food delivery was omitted. These lights
may indeed be acting as a conditioned reinforcers, and
sustain LLL-seeking behavior until the primary reinforcer
eventually comes (as in second-order schedules, see
Everitt and Robbins, 2000). These considerations may
help formulating a possible explanation, namely that
training with the uncertainty challenge was gradual
enough for rats to realize that large reinforcement eventu-
ally comes, despite the repeated and unpredictable omis-
sions. Preference for LLL until odds of 5 and 6 is striking,
since over 80% of these nose-poking demands did not
trigger any food delivery. It is intriguing to note that the
average waiting-time for the eventual LLL reward was 60
seconds or more, a delay which produced a considerable
aversion for LL reward when assessed in the ID protocol.
It is noteworthy that animals faced with either delays or
omissions reacted in two distinct ways. After a substantial
similarity at the mildest levels of LL/L rarefaction, choice
curves began to diverge beyond odds = 1, which was sub-
stantially equivalent to delay = 30 s. In our opinion, the
crucial difference between LL and LLL rewards is that the
former is delayed in a signaled and predictable manner,
whereas delay in obtaining the latter is completely unpre-
dictable and luck-linked (Cardinal et al., 2000). Indeed,
once triggered, the delay in the ID protocol must follow its
scheduled duration, and there is nothing that animals can
do. This situation is likely to induce a state of frustration,
thus generating intolerance/aversion for delays. Con-
versely, after each omitted large-reward delivery in the PD
protocol, animals have the possibility to express another
nose-poking choice. In general, there are more opportuni-
ties of nose-poking choices in the PD protocol, and this
may help animals to feel that the situation is more "under
control". A great number of studies have shown that con-
trollability of stress sources helps animals to cope with
adverse contingencies, and hence uncertainty of LLL
reward should be not necessarily expected to produce
aversion.
From our data, it seems that LLL rewards are actively pre-
ferred by rats. Animals apparently adopted the strategy to
wait for a "lucky" but "rare" event, rather than collecting
many smaller reinforcement. There are two possible
Table 2: Number of food pellets received in either task around the ideal/mathematical indifference point, compared with the 
"theoretical" food gain (amount of food pellets that rats could have eaten if they behaved just as their siblings in the other protocol 
did, n = 8).
ID task PD task






45 3 83.3 ± 2.5 vs 123.3 ± 5.9 * 69.0 ± 6.4 vs 61.0 ± 5.5
60 4 67.9 ± 1.6 vs 100.8 ± 6.6 * 54.5 ± 3.8 vs 55.8 ± 4.3
75 5 58.3 ± 1.8 vs 84.2 ± 7.9 * 43.8 ± 3.6 vs 47.8 ± 3.3
In the ID task, it would be economically convenient to keep preferring the LL choice, demonstrating that task contingencies are still before the 
indifference. In the PD task, either choice is substantially indifferent from the economical viewpoint, demonstrating that task contingencies are 
under conditions of quasi-indifference. * p < 0.05 in post-hoc comparisons drawn between the "actual" and the "potential" food amounts.BMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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explanations for this finding. One is that animals devel-
oped a "habit", the other is that rats were perhaps
attracted by "binge" reinforcement, without being
affected by its uncertainty neither by its rarefaction. As for
the first possible explanation, the finding of minor effects
on choice behavior in the PD protocol may indicate that
the choice of nose-poking hole somewhat continued to
occur independently from the outcome. This could sug-
gest that rats developed a compulsive and perseverant
hole preference, possibly due to the establishment of a
behavioral habit. In other words, normal rats seem to
express a sort of fixed habit-based responding, rather than
being open to an evaluation of the actual outcome.
Accordingly, recent findings (Adriani et al., 2004) raise
the question of behavioral inflexibility (with a tendency
to perseveration) shown during preference shifts, and sug-
gest that some individuals may be less flexible than others
(Evenden, 2002; Laviola et al., 2003). However, whilst PD
rats were quite insensitive to LLL rarefaction, their ID-pro-
tocol siblings quickly displayed intolerance against large-
reinforcement delay. ID subjects showed a shift to SS
choice, a finding fully consistent with impulsivity-based
responding, according to previous work (Evenden and
Ryan 1996, 1999). It seems unlikely that PD rats were
characterized by a lack of flexibility when their ID siblings
were able to shift in their choice. Thus, we propose that
the PD protocol generates a true "instinctive" preference
for LLL rewards. Noteworthy, our present findings une-
quivocally suggest that rats prefer a random-coming
reward, delivered eventually and all-at-once, rather than a
similar overall gain, collected by slow accumulation of
smaller unitary bits. In PD rats, the salient cue to decision
seems to reside into the size attractivity of unitary reward,
and not in frequency of its delivery nor in the total
amount gained (or lost) over time.
Classical definitions of impulsivity predict that a given
factor (delay, uncertainty) shall discount large-reward
value, and that a choice shift is then observed against eco-
nomic convenience of the outcome (Evenden, 1999; Ho
et al., 1999; Monterosso and Ainslie, 1999). The phenom-
enon of uncertainty-produced discounting did not occur
in our hands. It is likely that animals would eventually
show a shift towards SS, at least for "p" values much lower
than those presently tested. However, a shift to SS reward
would be economically convenient in these conditions,
and cannot therefore be used as an index of impulsive
behavior. Indeed, only anti-economical choices can be
considered an unbiased and reliable index in the field of
impulsive decision making (Evenden, 1999; Ho et al.,
1999; Monterosso and Ainslie, 1999). Such kind of con-
siderations also apply to interpretation of data by Mobini
and colleagues (2000, 2002). These authors employed a
"small"/"large" reward ratio of 0.5 (Mathematical indif-
ference point at "p" = 50%) and tested rats under a range
of "p" values well beyond this point (Mobini et al., 2000,
2002). In our opinion, by promoting a preference shift
according to (rather than against) economical conven-
ience, these features do bias the preference shift as a
parameter for impulsive decision making. Abnormalities
in the process of large-reward discounting, observed by
these authors in rats after various manipulations, might
well be discussed in terms of altered perception of reward
magnitudes and/or deficits in comparing global payoff of
either choice option. In other words, their protocol con-
tingencies may be useful to evaluate abnormalities in the
emergence of an economically-forced shift in choice
behavior, being conversely not suitable to measure impul-
sive choice, by definition.
Two considerations must be highlighted here regarding
models of reward discounting. It is assumed that, when
animals discount the value of a delayed or uncertain
reward, then the value of the SS reward is compared
against the discounted value of the LL/L reward to take a
decision. These considerations are put forward by also
assuming that perception of reward size is equivalent in
both paradigms and that odds against rewarding may be
compared across the two protocols. A first consideration
is that delay-induced discounting is apparently a more
reliable phenomenon than uncertainty-induced discount-
ing. In other words, rats poorly cope with delay and ines-
capable waiting constraints, whereas they accept
unpredictable omissions in reward-delivery. Moreover,
under the present conditions, where the final net foraging
was not affected, rats preferred to work for "binge wins",
even at high levels of rarefaction, rather than shifting
towards a SS-seeking strategy. The latter, made of nose-
poking for a lower and constant outcome, would imply a
flatter distribution of food gains. Such observation again
suggests that very similar temporal distributions, made of
bouts of five pellets coming far apart each other, are
potentially generated in both tasks. However, such kind of
distribution can be avoided, when the distance between
bouts is an inflexible constraint (ID task), and can con-
versely be preferred, when its length varies in an unpre-
dictable way (PD task). One possible explanation for the
preference, displayed in the latter task, is that the LLL-
choice behaviour may be reinforced by the contrast
between many no-food trials and the eventual five-pellet
one. Such kind of contrasts have been shown to increase
dopaminergic activity in the midbrain (Fiorillo et al.,
2003), and may support risk-taking behaviour (Van den
Bos et al., 2005).
A second consideration is that there might be a pitfall in
those models, where criteria for decision reside in com-
parison between unitary value of SS versus unitary dis-
counted value of LL/L reward. This assumption may stand
valid for a sort of "instinctive" decision process, where twoBMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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alternative unitary values are first discounted and then
compared. But more "evolved" decision processes may
occur, where animals may be capable to take into account
the global convenience of a choice strategy, by consider-
ing delivery failures and food amount earned (or lost)
across multiple choices. This kind of process requires the
ability to consider, beyond each single choice, the esti-
mated quantity of food gained having access to many
choices during a given time interval. Without taking into
account this process, the conceptual models describing
decision making may be limited. In this light, the PD task
adopted here is suggested to unveil attraction for "binge
and rare" over "low and constant" reinforcement, when
rarefaction is obtained by random omissions (rather than
a constant delay) of reinforcer delivery. This behavioral
drive, consisting of willingness to seek for a highly reward-
ing sensation despite association with some negative fea-
tures (such as random rarefaction in the present case), is
not surprising. Much effort has been devoted to study
determinants of risk-seeking drives, in terms of neurobio-
logical substrates and adaptive function (Bardo et al.,
1996; Laviola et al., 1999). Present observations may
open new perspectives for studies in the field of peculiar
(patho)physiological conditions, such as sensation seek-
ing, reckless behavior, and gambling.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that behavioral output in a two-choice
operant paradigm provides precious information about
decision-making strategies. However, we showed quite
clearly that the decision taken by animals, in terms of
choice between a larger (but less frequent) versus a
smaller reinforcer, provides insights that do not necessar-
ily reside within the "impulsivity" dimension. Depending
on protocol contingencies, and specifically in the absence
of the strong aversion otherwise elicited by inflexible
delays, other dimensions emerge, such as the natural
attraction for "binge" reinforcement. Under conditions of
economical quasi-indifference, i.e. when there were no
overt adverse consequences on the total foraging, such
attraction was able to sustain the LLL preference, despite a
considerable rarefaction in actual food delivery. Under
these contingencies, animals can freely choose a temporal
profile of reward distribution, ranging between two possi-
ble extremes: a "sharper" one, made of random-coming
"lucky-strike" episodes, separated by time intervals of
uncertain duration, or a "smoother" one, obtained by a
more frequent alternation of either choice. The latter strat-
egy would possibly allow to dilute the frustration, associ-
ated with the unlucky attempts to obtain more food, with
a more frequent nose-poking for the single and certain
pellet. However, not always laboratory animals are driven
by simplistic cost/benefit rules. It is known that some
strategies, being apparently less rewarded and/or requir-
ing more effort, are often adopted and perhaps more
adaptive, a phenomenon called "contrafreeloading" (Ing-
lis et al., 1997). In the present specific case, rats may be
specifically motivated by the "temptation to gamble" and
may conversely find more "boring" a monotonous collec-
tion of small bits. In this frame, we propose that such a
behavioral dimension might more closely resemble fea-
tures that are typical of a "gambling" trait. The present
study may thus provide novel useful insights for the inter-
pretation of PD tasks.
It should be underlined that these two protocols may be
used to probe animals for the balance between "primor-
dial" and "evolved" drives. In other words, a similar proc-
ess is likely to be required to overcome aversion to delay
and attraction for "binge" rewarding, in order to produce
more self-controlled individuals. In theory, it should be
possible to modulate the weight of primordial "delay
aversion" and "binge-reward attraction" drives, and/or the
ability to inhibit these primordial drives to express an
evolved and truly self-controlled response. Such ability is
known to require intact serotonergic activity (Wogar et al.,
1993; Harrison et al., 1997; Puumala and Sirvio, 1998;
Dalley et al., 2002), expecially within the pre-frontal cor-
tex (McClure et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004) and
the cortico-striatal projections (Cardinal et al., 2004;
Christakou et al., 2004). We have recently obtained some
data, showing that exposure to methylphenidate during
adolescence resulted in enduring changes, adult rats being
more self-controlled in both tasks. Specifically, methyl-
phenidate-exposed rats were less impulsive in the ID pro-
tocol (Adriani et al., in preparation), thus increasing their
overall food gain, and showed an increase of low-risk cer-
tain-payoff nose-poking in the PD protocol, thus smooth-
ing the temporal distribution of foraging and diluting the
uncertainly-rewarded periods (Adriani et al., 2005). These
animals were apparently not driven by "delay-avoidance"
nor by "binge-attraction". Rather, they seemed to over-
come such instinctive drives, by looking beyond single-
choice outcome and by taking into account the long-term
payoff.
A final remark shall underline that the present data were
obtained on adolescent rats, which are known to differ
substantially from adults in reward-related manifestations
(Spear, 2000; Laviola et al., 1999, 2003). Whether these
findings can be extended to adult rats remains an open
question, deserving further work. We demonstrated previ-
ously that adolescent mice are more impulsive than adult
ones (Adriani and Laviola, 2003) but, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no rat studies comparing age-
dependent profiles for either ID or PD task. Present data
are however relevant in view of recent literature, suggest-
ing that animal models of adolescence may be useful to
evaluate age-related physiological trajectories that may, in
some cases, progress into psycho-pathological processesBMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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(Andersen, 2003). In this frame, elaboration of correct
expectations from two-choice protocols is essential for a
deeper psycho-biological investigation of reward-seeking
abnormalities.
Methods
Experimental protocols were approved by institutional
authorities and are in close agreement with European
Community Directives and with the Italian Law. All
efforts were made to minimize animal suffering, to reduce
the number of animals used, and to use alternatives to in
vivo testing.
Subjects, and rearing conditions
Eight Wistar pregnant female rats (Harlan, Italy) were
housed in an air-conditioned room (temperature 21 ±
1°C, relative humidity 60 ± 10%), with a 12-hr light-dark
cycle (lights on at 8.00 am). Water and food (Enriched
Standard Diet, Mucedola, Settimo Milanese, Italy) were
available ad libitum. The day of delivery was considered as
post natal day (PND) zero, pups being culled to 6 males
and 2 females. Pups were then weaned on PND 21 and
housed in groups of two siblings, according to sex. Only
two male subjects per litter were used in this experiment,
the other four male subjects being used for other experi-
ments. Within each litter, one sibling was assigned to the
ID protocol group and the other to the PD protocol group
(n = 8). Animals were tested for choice behavior in a drug-
free state during adolescence (PND 30 to 46).
Two-choice operant-behavior tests
Animals were tested in one of two protocols, involving a
delay- or probability-based rarefaction of large reward
(see Introduction). Before the schedule started, animals
were food-restricted for two days, to keep them at 80–
85% of their free-feeding weight in order to increase their
motivation to work for food delivery. Each animal was
then placed daily in a computer-controlled operant cham-
ber (Coulbourn Instruments, USA), provided with two
nose-poking holes, a chamber light, a feeder device, a
magazine where pellets (45 mg, BioServ, USA) were
dropped, and a magazine light. The nose-poking in either
hole was detected by a photocell and was recorded by a
computer, which also controlled food delivery. After the
25-min session, animals were returned to their home
cage, where they were given standard chow (approxi-
mately 10 g/each). During the daily sessions, rats were
able to eat approximately 3 g of food, i.e. only a small part
of their daily need. It is therefore unlikely that levels of
hunger experienced by rats changed substantially during
the session. This methodological remark is important,
since self-control measures are known to be directly mod-
ulated by levels of hunger (Kirk and Logue, 1997).
During the training phase (one week), nose-poking in one
of the two holes resulted in the delivery of five pellets of
food, whereas nose-poking in the other hole resulted in
the delivery of one pellet of food. After nose-poking and
before food delivery, the chamber light was turned on for
1 second. Following food delivery, the magazine light was
turned on for 15 seconds, during which nose-poking was
recorded but was without scheduled consequences (time-
out). The magazine light was then turned off, and the sys-
tem was set ready for the next food-rewarded nose-poking
trial. The total number of trials and the inter-trial time
were not fixed, since rats were free to express nose-poking
for food at their individually-variable rate during the 25-
min session.
During the testing phase (one week), the two protocols
differed slightly. In the ID protocol, a signaled delay was
added to the 1 s-interval, normally scheduled between
nose-poking and large-reward delivery. The chamber light
was kept on during the entire length of this delay. The
small reward delivery was unchanged. Hence, animals
had choice between a "LARGE & LATE" (LL) or a "SMALL
& SOON" (SS) reward. In the PD protocol, a probabilistic
dimension was associated to the delivery of the large
reward. The chamber and the magazine lights were turned
on after nose-poking following the usual schedule. How-
ever, sometimes the delivery of large reward could be
omitted, according to a given level of probability ("p" =
percentage of actual food delivery over total demands).
The small reward delivery was unchanged. Hence, animals
had choice between a "LARGE & LUCK-LINKED" (LLL) or
a "SMALL & SURE" (SS) reward.
The delay length and the probability level were kept fixed
for each daily session, and were changed progressively
over days (see Table 1). Only one session was run for each
delay value and "p" level, which were thus changed daily.
To be sure that data generated in both protocols were
comparable, delay and probability values were chosen in
order to produce a similar rarefaction level in actual deliv-
ery of large reward in either protocol (termed LL/L). In
other words, within each given daily session, the number
of large rewards earned per time unit had to be similar in
both protocols, as far as possible. This was obtained by
referring probability values to the corresponding "odds
against reinforcing", which are defined as the mean
number of omitted large-reward delivery ("unlucky"
events) before an actual delivery ("lucky" event). The rela-
tion between probability values and odds is simply math-
ematical, the formula being "p" = 1/(odds+1). When
moving from the PD to the ID protocol, the delay to be
imposed (for ID task) corresponds to the length of time
elapsed during timeouts of unlucky events (for PD task).
It is easy to demonstrate then that delay = timeout × odds
(see Figure 1). This is an ideal and limit situation, inBMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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which the incidence of small-reward choices, and of inter-
trial intervals generated by spontaneous waiting, is obvi-
ously not taken into account. A more realistic account
would require that delay = (timeout + inter-trial) × odds.
It is substantially evident that any odds-equivalent delay
duration is actually longer in the realistic than in the ideal
situation. However, since the inter-trial value cannot in
any way be predicted a priori, the delay duration to be run
for each daily session, in correspondence to each odds
level, was calculated before the experiment in the ideal sit-
uation (no spontaneous waiting). Equivalence between
odds/probability and delay was re-estimated a posteriori,
by considering spontaneous waiting (around 10 s in the
PD task, see Results). Table 1 shows the delay duration
chosen for testing (a priori values), and odds-equivalent
delay values, re-estimated after the experiment (a posteri-
ori values). In other words, the white point at delay = 75 s
was substantially equivalent to the black point at odds = 3
(see Figure 2, dotted line). Hence, the curve generated in
the ID task was scaled to the left, to an extent depending
on the re-calculated equivalence (see Figure 3).
The mathematical indifference point, at which either
choice was mathematically identical in terms of total for-
aging, was odds = 4 ("p" = 20%), corresponding to delay
= 60 s (at least from a priori calculations in the ideal situ-
ation). We imposed a range of delay and "p" values before
the mathematical indifference point, when LL/L was
always the optimal choice (see Introduction). Rats were
also tested around the mathematical indifference point,
when none of the options was economically optimal (see
Table 2). Rats were not tested far beyond the indifference
point.
Economic features of the two protocols
In both protocols, around the mathematical indifference
point (i.e. sessions with odds 3 to 5), we calculated the
number of food pellets actually earned by rats. We also
Schematic diagram showing equivalence between ID and PD  protocols at the mathematical indifference point (odds  against reinforcing = 4) Figure 1
Schematic diagram showing equivalence between ID and PD 
protocols at the mathematical indifference point (odds 
against reinforcing = 4). Arrows represent nose-poking for 
large reward by rats. In the PD protocol, there are an aver-
age of four "unlucky" events (omissions) before a "lucky" 
event (5-pellet food delivery). In the ID protocol, the delay 
interval should be at least four times the time-out (delay = 15 
× 4 = 60 seconds) to reproduce a 5-pellet delivery with 
approximately the same temporal characteristics as in the PD 
protocol. To turn this ideal situation into a more realistic 
account, four times the spontaneous waiting observed 
between two consecutive trials (further 10 × 4 = 40 sec-
onds) shall be added to delay duration (see Table 1). To opti-
mize performance for long-term benefit, choice should be 
LL/L before the mathematical indifference point, and SS 
beyond it.
Choice behavior in rats (n = 8) tested with either the intoler- ance-to-delay (ID) or the probability discounting (PD) proto- cols, shown during subsequent daily sessions Figure 2
Choice behavior in rats (n = 8) tested with either the intoler-
ance-to-delay (ID) or the probability discounting (PD) proto-
cols, shown during subsequent daily sessions. Data represent 
the mean (± SEM) choice (%) of the larger reinforcer, deliv-
ered either after a delay (LL in the ID protocol) or with a 
certain degree of probability (LLL in the PD protocol). In 
correspondence to each odds level, delay duration to be run 
was calculated a priori (see also Table 1). Equivalence 
between odds/probability and delay was re-estimated a pos-
teriori (see e.g. dotted line). The vertical line shows the 
mathematical indifference point in the PD task, separating the 
field before (left to the line) from beyond (right to the line) it. 
The horizontal line shows the level of rats' indifferent choice, 
separating preference for LL/L (above the line) from prefer-
ence for SS (below the line). * p < 0.05 when comparing 
across protocols within a given daily session.BMC Neuroscience 2006, 7:52 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/7/52
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calculated the potential number of pellets that each rat
could have gained with an opposite choice-preference
behavior. This was done by assigning, to each individual
rat, the percent choice value actually expressed by its sib-
ling. Specifically, the total number of trials actually com-
pleted by each rat during the session (LL/L+SS nose-
poking) was re-assigned between LL/L and SS, based on
percent choice shown by the sibling rat in the other pro-
tocol. For the ID protocol, the total number of trials
(LL+SS) was also facing an upper limitation, due to the
time-limited session. In particular, the amount of time
needed to express the novel estimated number of trials
(re-assigned LL + re-assigned SS) was calculated, in terms
of delay duration plus timeout intervals for each rat. In
one case, this sum exceeded the total session duration (25
min), and re-assigned LL and re-assigned SS values were
thus diminished proportionally. The total number of the-
oretically potential pellets was always calculated as 5*re-
assigned-LL + re-assigned-SS. For the PD protocol, we first
calculated the re-assigned SS and LLL trials by assigning to
the PD rats the percent choice of the ID sibling. Once esti-
mated, the number of trials with a LLL attempt was then
turned into "lucky" LLL trials based on the level of "p"
actually experienced by the PD rat itself. The number of
theoretically potential pellets was 5*re-assigned-
LLL*actual-p-value + re-assigned-SS.
Design and data analysis
Data were analyzed by randomized-block ANOVA. The
first dependent variable was the choice (%) for the large
reinforcer, namely percentage of LL/L over total LL/L+SS
choices. The general design of the experiment was a 2-
level protocol (ID vs PD) × 11-level session ("p" or delay
level fixed for each session) factors. The dependent varia-
ble of the second analysis was the total number of pellet,
in order to compare those actually eaten with the poten-
tial food gain, calculated theoretically as described above.
Data from ID and PD tasks were analyzed separately. The
design was a 2-level payoff (actual vs potential) × 3-level
session (odds level: 3 to 5) factors. Multiple comparisons
were performed with the Tukey HSD Test.
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